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Introduction 
 
In 1842 the United States Supreme Court came to an 8-1 decision in a case that was 
highly controversial on a national scale. While Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842) directly involved 
only the fate of one family, it held major significance for all the inhabitants of the nation, 
whether enslaved or free. When Justice Joseph Story delivered the Opinion of the Court that the 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 was constitutional and no state could pass any law expanding upon or 
interfering with the regulations contained therein, it became quite clear that slaveholders had 
gained a major victory over those opposed to the institution. Yet these terms were not the only 
cause for concern among anti-slavery advocates, as the Court went on to state that slave owners 
and their hired agents possessed the right to self-help in regards to recapturing their fugitive 
slaves, that state officials were recommended but not required to assist in this process, and that 
the accused runaway was not entitled to the right of due process.1 Although tension had been 
building over the issue of fugitive slaves throughout the early nineteenth century, not until 
Edward Prigg and his party kidnapped a black woman named Margaret Morgan and her family 
from freedom in Pennsylvania in order to bring them to work as slaves in Maryland did the 
turmoil truly become a national concern. Prigg abducted the family after failing to produce 
definitive evidence to a Pennsylvania judge that Morgan was a runaway slave. This came up 
short of the regulations set forth by the state, and Morgan and her family were declared free. In 
an attempt to defend Prigg, the defense asserted that the requirements set by Pennsylvania were 
unconstitutional because they went beyond the national regulations set forth by Congress in the 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793. 
                                                          
     1 “Prigg v. Pennsylvania,” in Melvin I. Urofsky and Paul Finkelman eds., Documents of American Constitutional & 
Legal History: Volume I, From the Founding to 1896, 3rd ed., 329.  
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 The law of Congress questioned in Prigg grew out of Article IV, Section 2 of the United 
States Constitution, or what is commonly referred to as the fugitive slave clause. This is one of 
the three main segments of the document which directly dealt with the institution of slavery. 
Article I, Section 2 and Article I, Section 9 are the other two provisions. The former set forth the 
value of slaves in terms of representation and direct taxation, while the latter outlined the ability 
of Congress to regulate the importation of slaves. Following their establishment, these sections 
became known as the three-fifths clause and the slave trade clause, respectively. Although 
neither the word ‘slave’ nor ‘slavery’ appear in the Constitution, it does not require much effort 
to realize what these provisions intended. All had been created in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania by 
the delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787, yet received different levels of attention. 
The three-fifths and slave trade provisions were discussed at length by the delegates to the 
Convention and there were a variety of opinions expressed on the matter. Yet following the 
ratification of the Constitution these sections proved to lead to no further level of serious tension. 
Conversely, the section regarding fugitive slaves was not debated in 1787, and was basically 
thrown into the document as an afterthought. Unlike the other two slave-related clauses, in the 
years following the formal structuring of the United States, this particular aspect of the document 
was the center of a great deal of turmoil throughout the nation as it highlighted the increasingly 
sectional differences that existed between those states which favored slavery and those that did 
not. This paper seeks to bring to light the irony that the issues of apportionment for 
representation, along with taxation, and the slave trade were sources of major contention during 
the Constitutional Convention yet proved to receive minimal attention throughout their 
functional existence, while the provision for the treatment of fugitive slaves was seemingly 
unimportant in 1787 but proved to be immensely controversial on a national scale over the 
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following seventy years. Acts passed by Congress, Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842), and the sheer 
number of slaves who participated in the effort of running away all played major roles in 
developing turmoil and exposing sectional differences. 
There is a good deal of scholarship on the relationship between the Constitution and 
slavery. Prior to the early twentieth century, this focus was largely overlooked except by avid 
abolitionists whose publications had nearly been forgotten until being re-evaluated by a number 
of historians in recent years. Efforts such as these, along with a newfound interest in the topic, 
led to an increase in the amount of research conducted on slavery and the Constitution. Some 
authors have attempted to portray the founders as the developers of a proslavery document for 
selfish purposes, while others wish to lift the blame from these men in hopes of demonstrating 
that they did the best they could as a result of the context and circumstances surrounding them. 
While these interpretations are clearly different from one another, they have collectively been 
effective in shedding new light on the subject. The modern challenges to the traditional views of 
the founding fathers stem from those contributed by a prominent historian of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century who opened the door to new ways of interpreting the Constitution 
and the efforts behind its creation. 
In 1913, Charles A. Beard published the first edition of his book titled, An Economic 
Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. This scholarly work has remained relevant 
to this day resulting in large part from the fact that it was the first notable piece of literature 
which boldly challenged the long-held views as to how the United States was founded. Beard 
describes that prior to his efforts the three leading conceptions were: the nation was founded by 
guidance from above and morality, the uncanny ability of the English-speaking world to develop, 
   
6 
 
and the assumption that justice was the main instrument involved.2 According to Beard, the 
major flaw with these interpretations was that they neglected to attempt to truly analyze the 
causes behind the formation of the United States, which he asserts were economic interests. In 
support of such a claim, the author discusses how the Philadelphia Convention consisted of only 
a certain number of delegates and that they held specific property interests. Beard suggests that 
nearly all those who were in favor of the proposed document were “merchants, money lenders, 
security holders, manufacturers, shippers, capitalists, and financiers and their professional 
associates…” while those in opposition were mostly “… the non-slaveholding farmers and the 
debtors.”3 Taking this into consideration, the author declares that it was clearly not a document 
created by or for the entirety of the population, but was instead an attempt to protect the 
monetary interests of a few. Although the main argument of this book does not explicitly focus 
on slavery, Beard does make clear that slaves were one of the major property interests of the 
time. This lack of specific attention to the institution and its impact on the formation of the 
Constitution opened the door for later scholars to utilize Beard as a starting point for examining 
this issue. 
 Two historians who have directly addressed the economic interpretation held by Beard 
are Staughton Lynd and David Waldstreicher. Both authors attempt to shed light on the impact of 
slavery on the creation of the Constitution and do so through a modern lens which developed 
through increased research since the time of Beard. In Class Conflict, Slavery, and the United 
States Constitution, Lynd expresses his opinion that Beard minimized the role of slavery and 
even went so far as to title his introduction “Beyond Beard.” He contends that Beard lost sight of 
the institution as being “an independent force in the shaping and ratification of the document” 
                                                          
     2 Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (New York: Macmillan 
Publishing Co., Inc., 1913), 1-4.  
     3 Beard, 17.   
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through neglecting to examine the abolitionist complaints that the Constitution was evil through 
its compromise over slavery.4 Going on, Lynd states that Beard was extremely vague in his 
discussion of the institution and although he categorizes slaves as property he does not specify 
any further. Lynd finds additional disagreement with the fact that Beard groups slaveholders with 
all other agrarian interests and pits them against capitalists.5 In another book, Slavery’s 
Constitution: From Revolution to Ratification, Waldstreicher similarly suggests that Beard’s 
assertion that the Constitution was a reflection of the financial interests of capitalists against the 
farming class was exaggerated while the impact of slavery went overlooked.6 Waldstreicher does 
acknowledge that the economic implications described by Beard are valuable to understanding 
the history of the United States, yet believes that such implications cannot be separated from 
those of the institution of slavery. While the recognition that Beard’s work remains valuable is 
demonstrated by these authors, it is also evident that such historians are under the impression that 
he failed to sufficiently address the influence of slavery. In recent years most arguments on the 
issue have fallen under one of two categories: that the Constitution was proslavery or that it was 
neutral in its intent. 
 A strong case has been made by several authors that the document which shaped the 
United States was supportive of the peculiar institution. Waldstreicher states that the story of the 
founding needs to be retold and highlights his argument that slavery was intertwined with the 
formation of the famous document. He regards as a misconception the belief that the 
contradiction of the American Revolution and keeping blacks in bondage was a paradox left by 
                                                          
     4 Staughton Lynd, Class Conflict, Slavery, and the United States Constitution, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 148.  
     5 Lynd, 151.  
     6 David Waldstreicher, Slavery’s Constitution: From Revolution to Ratification (New York: Hill and Wang, 2009), 
15. 
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the founders to be dealt with by later generations.7 Rather, Waldstreicher holds that “slavery was 
as important to the making of the Constitution as the Constitution was to the survival of 
slavery.”8 He identifies a number of clauses in the document that directly involved the system 
and several others which had implications for it. Included in this list are the three provisions 
discussed in this paper, as well as the fact that counting slaves as three-fifths was beneficial to 
slaveholders because Congress was given the power to mobilize the militia as a means of 
suppressing uprisings.9 In his work titled Slavery and the Founders: Race and Liberty in the Age 
of Jefferson, Paul Finkelman echoes the notion that there were a variety of Constitutional clauses 
which affected the institution of slavery in a largely positive way and views this as evidence that 
it was a proslavery document. He goes on to suggest that the debates surrounding the Convention 
and ratification process were heavily saturated with slavery and that in the end the slaveholders 
won the protection of the institution they were looking for. While both Finkelman and 
Waldstreicher make note of the fact that the words ‘slave’ and ‘slavery’ do not appear in the 
Constitution, they find it impossible to deny its strong presence.  
 These are not the only scholars to recognize the Constitution as favorable of the 
institution. Further arguments are made in Class, Conflict, Slavery and the United States 
Constitution, by Staughton Lynd, and Slave Nation: How Slavery United the Colonies & Sparked 
the American Revolution, by Alfred and Ruth Blumrosen. Both books claim that slavery was at 
the core of all political happenings in the late eighteenth century, and that the Constitution was 
supportive of the system. Lynd argues that it was a major failure of the founders to not remove, 
or even attempt to remove, slavery from the nation and that what they created was supportive of 
the institution and went directly against the efforts of the American Revolution. The Blumrosens 
                                                          
     7 Waldstreicher, 13.  
     8 Waldstreicher, 17.  
     9 Waldstreicher, 6.  
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convey similar beliefs, yet go a step further to claim that the agreement that the nation would 
continue to utilize and be shaped by slavery took place prior to the American Revolution and that 
the institution was one of the driving forces behind the conflict.10 With the South growing in 
dependence on slavery and the North beginning to develop more and more into an antislavery 
region, the authors believe that the sections were headed towards becoming two separate entities. 
However, with the ruling of the Somerset case in Great Britain in 1772 (which declared that a 
slave brought to England by his master who then escaped was to remain free because of a 
conflict of laws in which Great Britain did not allow slavery within its borders), southern 
slaveholders grew fearful and sought to unite with the northerners, who “agreed to its (slavery’s) 
permanence in the new nation.”11 While such an agreement was made early on, the authors 
contend that the compromise which resulted in the Constitution and Northwest Ordinance 
worked as a way of sealing the contract. Lynd finds this notion of significance, dedicating a 
chapter to an analysis of the nearly undeniable likelihood of a private agreement which allowed 
for the adoption of the Three-Fifths Compromise and the adoption of the Northwest Ordinance to 
come one day apart.12 
 Recent historians have also addressed the abolitionist views of the Constitution as 
presented in the century following its ratification. Staughton Lynd finds this area of scholarship 
overlooked, and believes it necessary to bring the efforts of these advocates back into the 
historical spectrum. A number of nineteenth century historians are taken into consideration 
resulting from the fact that they published abolitionist interpretations of the founding of the 
United States. These men include Horace Greeley, Henry Wilson, and Richard Hildreth, and 
                                                          
     10 Alfred W. Blumrosen and Ruth G. Blumrosen, Slave Nation: How Slavery United the Colonies and Sparked the 
American Revolution (Naperville, Illinois: Sourcebooks, Inc., 2005), xii.  
     11 Blumrosen, xiii.  
     12 Lynd, 185-186.  
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Lynd suggests that such individuals believed that the compromise over slavery within the 
Constitution betrayed the American Revolution, and states that through his own analysis it is 
clear that this concept is an accurate one.13 Mentioned in the work of Lynd but more thoroughly 
addressed by Paul Finkelman are the strong opinions and actions by abolitionist William Lloyd 
Garrison and his followers. Finkelman begins his book with a discussion of the pure outrage 
expressed by the Garrisonians and how this anger caused them to withdraw from politics. 
Finding the Constitution to be an evil contract as a result of its protection of slavery this group 
believed participation in the government was corrupt and would only strengthen the peculiar 
institution.14 Both Lynd and Finkelman draw upon the abolitionist critique of the Constitution as 
solid evidence of the protection and support of slavery found in the document, and it provides a 
foundation in each of their works.  
 Along these same lines, Gary B. Nash presents his view in Race and Revolution that the 
fact that slavery was protected in the Constitution was “not a judicious decision by the leaders of 
the new American nation but their most tragic failure.”15 The author asserts that this is the case 
because the 1770s and 1780s were the best opportunity for the institution of slavery to be 
abolished. Among other reasons, Nash states that anti-slavery sentiment was at a high point, the 
lower South was incapable to break off on their own, and that western lands could have been 
used for slaveholder compensation or to relocate free blacks. In his opinion these were all factors 
which made this the right time to rid the nation of slavery.16 Although the author provides a 
solution with the final factor previously mentioned, Nash argues that the failure to take 
advantage of the circumstances was the result of a loss of “abolitionist fire” among northerners 
                                                          
     13 Lynd, 155-156, 183.  
     14 Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders: Race and Liberty in the Age of Jefferson, 2nd ed. (Armonk, New 
York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2001), 3.  
     15 Gary B. Nash, Race and Revolution, (Madison, Wisconsin: Madison House Publishers, Inc., 1990), 6.   
     16 Nash, 6-7.   
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and southerners alike when posed with the economic question of how to help slaveholders 
recover from the potential loss, and what to do with all the freed slaves.17 Interestingly, Nash 
refutes the commonly accepted notion that South Carolina and Georgia would never have ratified 
the Constitution if the peculiar institution was not protected within it. While the other side of this 
opinion is presented later in this paper, in regards to the suggestion of Nash he claims that these 
two southernmost states were too weak to not join the union; namely as a result of their 
vulnerability through being so close to the Creek confederacy and Spanish-inhabited Florida.18 
The arguments presented by Nash are rather unique in comparison to the other literature on the 
subject, which has much to do with his decision to not grant much attention to the debates of the 
Constitutional Convention.  
 While the authors mentioned above find the compromise over slavery in the Constitution 
to be a failure or an atrocity on behalf of the founders, there are others who find the document to 
be more neutral in nature. Don E. Fehrenbacher writes in The Slaveholding Republic: An 
Account of the United States Government’s Relations to Slavery that the current trend of blaming 
the founders for failing to abolish slavery at the founding of the nation is off-base. The author 
focuses heavily on the internal debates over the peculiar institution at the Convention in 1787 as 
a means of attempting to demonstrate the extent to which the matter was discussed. 
Fehrenbacher ultimately finds that “the Convention was severely limited… by its own internal 
differences” which resulted in a compromise that was completed out of necessity.19 Viewing the 
efforts of the founders which culminated in the document as neither pro- nor anti-slavery, he 
contends that it was the manner in which it was interpreted and implemented during the 
                                                          
     17 Nash, 35.   
     18 Nash, 27.  
     19 Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the United State Government’s Relations to 
Slavery, ed. Ward M. McAfee (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 39.  
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nineteenth century that made it appear as though the Constitution held that slavery was to be 
protected outright.20 Along these same lines, Donald L. Robinson argues that the founders did 
not believe that slavery was dying out and as a result decided to protect it, as some have stated, 
but that they decided to avoid dealing too directly with the issue for other reasons. The 
differences in attitude toward the peculiar institution between the northern and southern states 
posed a tremendous challenge, one that at the time was impossible to overcome. Strong racial 
prejudices of the time also played a role in making the situation seem hopeless, and Robinson 
suggests that this was realized by the founders and slavery was deemed to be “ungovernable.”21 
Authors falling into the category of believing the Constitution to have had neutral 
intentions for the institution find that when the Convention and surrounding circumstances are 
taken in context, compromise was the only way by which a union could be formed – and it was 
one neither in favor nor in opposition of slavery. In The Founding Fathers Reconsidered, R. B. 
Bernstein utilizes this approach in a discussion of the men who formed the United States in terms 
of their overall efforts. He suggests that in order to best comprehend the actions of the founders it 
is necessary to “meet them eye to eye instead of gazing reverently upward or sneering 
contemptuously downward.”22 Such a view, Bernstein argues, reveals that they were simply men 
dealing with the issues at hand in the manner they saw best fit at the time. This included slavery, 
and the delegates to the Convention saw a union of the states as more pertinent than dealing too 
intensely with the peculiar institution. In order to ensure ratification in some states, especially 
South Carolina, the founders knew that it would be necessary to have a number of clauses 
                                                          
     20 Fehrenbacher, 47.  
     21 Donald L. Robinson, Slavery in the Structure of American Politics 1765-1820 (New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, Inc., 1971), 4.  
     22 R. B. Bernstein, The Founding Fathers Reconsidered (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), xi.  
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providing some level of protection for slavery, yet for the most part it was left to be dealt with by 
later generations.23 
When writing about the founding of the United States there are some historians who do 
so through evaluating the debates and ratification process on a more specific level, such as 
examining the interests of a particular state. In regards to the study of the relationship between 
slavery and the creation of the Constitution, perhaps the most pivotal state was South Carolina. 
All of the authors mentioned previously refer to the founding document as being a compromise 
between different interests and sections, and Richard M. Weir has attempted to demonstrate how 
South Carolina was the most influential player in support of the peculiar institution. He suggests 
that if the Constitution had not protected slavery to a certain extent this particular state would 
never have agreed to join the union. With their five delegates to the Convention being prominent 
slaveholders who “considered the existence of slavery in South Carolina to be an absolutely un-
negotiable issue,” it soon became obvious to other members that compromise must be made.24 
Weir makes note of the fact that delegates from other states even went so far as to mention that 
the main reason for the protection of the slave trade in the Constitution was a direct result of the 
demands of South Carolina and Georgia.25 Although it is not stated explicitly, such an 
understanding supports the argument of scholars such as Robinson and Fehrenbacher that the 
Convention developed a document that was necessary to ensure ratification and unity.  
It is clear that there are various viewpoints on the relationship between slavery and the 
Constitution, yet such differing notions are the result of the complexity of the issue. The leading 
sources for gathering information on this subject are notes from the Constitutional Convention 
                                                          
     23 Bernstein, 100.  
     24 Richard M. Weir, “South Carolina: Slavery and the Structure of the Union,” in Ratifying the Constitution, ed. 
Michael Allen Gillespie and Michael Lienesch (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1989), 209.  
     25 Weir, 209-210.  
   
14 
 
and the ratification debates of the states, or letters that have been preserved from the time period. 
Such a limited amount of material makes this issue one that is subject to a variety of 
interpretations. Those holding that the delegates to the Convention made a proslavery document 
for selfish gain and protection are able to support their claims with many of the same sources as 
those who find it neutral. While the sources mentioned above are intertwined with the topic of 
this paper, the argument presented here is unique in that it seeks to shed light on the ironic aspect 
of the relationship between the three main slave-related clauses of the Constitution and the 
importance of these in 1787 as compared with the course of the next seventy years. 
This paper is organized into three chapters, one for each clause, and they are arranged in 
the order which they appear in the Constitution. Chapter one spends the majority of its pages 
analyzing the debates at the Constitutional Convention over whether or not slaves should be 
counted for representation or taxation purposes, and if so to what extent. Different viewpoints are 
highlighted and the road to compromise is made clear. Attention then turns to the growth in 
overall population experienced by the northern and southern states in order to demonstrate how 
numbers in the former climbed at an incredibly faster rate than the latter, making any initial 
advantage the slaveholding states had in terms of representation irrelevant. Chapter two has a 
similar structure in that it conveys the different stances on the issue of importing slaves, and 
attention is paid to the threats made by the delegates from South Carolina and Georgia that their 
states would never ratify a Constitution that did not protect the peculiar institution to a certain 
extent. Once again population numbers are used to convey how these states obtained a 
satisfactory amount of forced laborers prior to the international slave trade being outlawed in 
1808. Following that year there was an extensive internal trade which supplied any new needs, 
and these factors eliminated any widespread desire to have the ports reopened. Finally, chapter 
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three spends only a brief segment on the Constitutional Convention because the fugitive slave 
clause was completely dealt with in about five sentences. This lack of attention would prove to 
be costly, as the rest of the chapter demonstrates the various ways in which the issue created 
national tension over the next seventy years. Finally, in a concluding section, the various 
arguments of the Convention and the explanations behind the alterations in level of importance 
of each clause are briefly restated and connected. 
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Chapter I 
Three-Fifths Clause 
 
In the debates surrounding the formation of the United States one of the most 
controversial topics of discussion involved how numbers would be determined for representation 
and direct taxation purposes. Although it was at the forefront during the Constitutional 
Convention, it had been an area of concern in the decade following the American Revolution as 
well. Within this conversation was the question of whether or not slaves should be counted 
toward either of these ends, and if so to what extent. Essentially, there were three main 
arguments that were asserted by the founding fathers involved in these debates. The first of these 
was the notion that slaves were undeniably considered as property and for that reason it was 
ridiculous to count them in terms of apportionment of representatives. Another assertion was that 
these forced laborers of the South were the equivalent of the poor workers of the North. Under 
this line of thinking, since both groups contributed to the nation’s economy, if one was to be 
regarded as part of the population so should the other. The third main suggestion was one that 
was expressed solely by men from the Mid-Atlantic and New England regions, and they stated 
that to count slaves toward representation was to benefit the South while placing a burden on 
northern states. On top of these arguments, there was a span of roughly one week during the 
Philadelphia Convention in which this issue was hotly debated, with a particular focus on 
determining the ratio with which slaves were to be counted in relation to whites. Ultimately, the 
delegates achieved compromise and the three-fifths clause was included in the Constitution of 
the United States under Article I, Section 2, which is part of the portion of the document centered 
on setting the framework of the legislative branch through outlining the structure of Congress.  
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After describing that the House of Representatives and direct taxes would be apportioned by 
state according to their population, it distinguishes this sum to be determined by “adding to the 
whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and 
excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.”26 While this issue was one of 
major contention in 1787, it never resulted in any turmoil throughout the rest of its functionality. 
The population of the northern states grew at such a significantly faster rate than that of the 
southern states, making irrelevant any potential advantage in the House the latter may have had 
by counting slaves towards apportionment. 
              The argument that slaves should in no way be counted as part of the population for the 
purposes of determining representation and taxation began during the debates over the creation 
of the Articles of Confederation. In the midst of the discussion, Maryland delegate Samuel Chase 
presented his view that there should be fixed quotas based off the number of “white 
inhabitants.”27 He acknowledged that taxation should relate directly to property, yet believed that 
this could never actually be the case, so population was the best alternative. Recognizing slaves 
as property he went on to state that there was no more of a reason to tax a southern farmer for his 
slaves than to tax a northern farmer for his cattle, and that slaves “should not be considered as 
members of the state.”28 Elbridge Gerry used a nearly identical rationale several years later at the 
Constitutional Convention, yet his focus was on representation rather than taxation. This 
argument is found in the notes of Robert Yates, delegate from New York, in his account of the 
debates. He writes that Gerry objected to the proposal that the property of slaves should count 
towards representation through the following statement: “Blacks are property, and are used, to 
the southward, as horses and cattle to the northward; and why should their representation be 
                                                          
     26 “Constitution of the United States,” Documents of American Constitutional and Legal History, 99.  
     27 Thomas Jefferson, “Jefferson’s Notes of Debate on Confederation,” in Elliot, Debates, 1:70.  
     28 Jefferson, 71.  
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increased to the southward, on account of the number of slaves, than horses or oxen to the 
north?.”29 Such words portray the realization by many delegates from the Mid-Atlantic, New 
England, and even Chesapeake states that it was contradictory for slave-owners to treat their 
slaves as property yet call for them to be considered as part of the population when it came to 
political representation.  
Throughout the General Convention, there were other approaches taken to this position. 
William Patterson (Paterson) of New Jersey declared his view on whether or not slaves should be 
counted toward representation as he made clear that in no way could he consider slaves as 
anything but property through stating: “They are no free agents, have no personal liberty, no 
faculty of acquiring property, but on the contrary are themselves property, and, like other 
property, entirely at the will of the master.”30 The focus then shifted to a hypothetical situation in 
which representatives were not used and rather the whole population of a state got to vote on 
national legislation, essentially the concept of direct democracy. Patterson asserted that if this 
were the case slaves would certainly not have a vote, and proceeded to ask why then should they 
be represented? It is clear that Patterson was pointing out that the representatives would not have 
the interest of the slaves in mind, which essentially defeats the purpose of this body of laborers 
counting towards apportionment. James Madison realized the validity of this opinion, and it 
prompted him to suggest the idea of having one national legislative branch be apportioned by 
only free citizens, while the other by total number of inhabitants, yet this notion did not go far.31  
Once again, it is clear that proponents of this viewpoint recognized the severe irony of the 
debates that even appear mind-boggling on their face to this day. Luther Martin expressed this in 
                                                          
     29 Robert Yates, “The Notes of the Secret Debates of the Federal Convention of 1787,” in Elliot, Debates, 1:406. 
     30 “Debates in the Federal Convention, from Monday, May 14, 1787, Until its Final Adjournment, Monday, 
September 17, 1787,” in Elliot, Debates, 5:289.  
     31 Debates in the Federal Convention, 290.  
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a letter following the Convention, in which he questioned how slaveholders could deprive a 
whole group of people of their rights, yet claim that they desired to have these same individuals 
counted toward government representation. However, whether it was decided that slaves were to 
be used to determine the number of representatives for a state or not, Martin found it proper to 
count all inhabitants toward taxation because it would help to discourage the peculiar institution. 
Dr. Benjamin Rush of Pennsylvania expressed still another view that only free inhabitants should 
count towards apportionment because it would have the effect to “discourage slavery and to 
encourage the increase of their [the state’s] free inhabitants.”32 While it was a slightly different 
approach, the general idea that efforts should be taken to discourage the institution of slavery 
was strongly supported by both Rush and Martin. 
On January 17, 1788, at the ratification debates of Massachusetts, Rufus King brought up 
the three-fifths clause. While in attendance at the Constitutional Convention, he expressed 
discontent with the matter, and once again King asserted that it was ridiculous to think that “five 
negro children of South Carolina are to pay as much tax as the three governors of New 
Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Connecticut.”33 Being a strong anti-slavery advocate, it seems 
that King was sympathetic to the condition of the slaves and for that reason found it shocking 
that they would be counted towards taxation. This also hints that he was in favor of varying 
levels of taxation, which would be determined by social and economic status. In response to this 
way of looking at the compromise, Samuel Nasson urged that one could look at the clause from 
another angle, and that “three of our (Massachusetts’) infants in the cradle are to be rated as five 
of the working negroes of Virginia.”34 From this perspective, Nasson believed that it was a good 
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deal for the northern states because he found it to be an appropriate balance. While these 
arguments are somewhat confusing, the main focus of the debates surrounding this issue was 
more often than not representation rather than taxation, and the provision for a direct taxation 
which incorporated a ratio of slaves was never utilized to any extent worthy of significance. 
The second main category into which arguments concerning this issue fell was that slaves 
should be included as a result of the fact that they added to the wealth of the nation. John Adams, 
of Massachusetts, believed that this was the case because slaves were essentially the same as a 
poor white laborer. His rationale followed that there was no difference between a man who 
makes just enough money to obtain the necessities of life and one who was provided these by an 
owner.35 Being the “wealth of his master” a slave should be counted for taxation purposes.36 This 
notion coming from an anti-slavery advocate like Adams is somewhat surprising upon a first 
glance, yet he was focusing on the topic of taxation more than that of representation. It is likely 
that he was willing to accept slaves being counted toward the latter as long as they were 
measured into the former as well. While making it challenging for slave owners to continue 
holding such large amounts of this ‘property,’ Adams may have seen it as a step towards 
recognizing slaves as human beings because they would be acknowledged as part of the 
population. While the true reasoning of Adams can only be speculated, during the Massachusetts 
debates over ratification of the Constitution, Thomas Dawes explicitly expressed that he held this 
belief. He contended that Massachusetts should be glad that the “black inhabitants” of the 
southern states were to be considered as people and not property. Since they must be perceived 
as one or the other, he found it to be in line with the “ideas of natural justice” held by their state 
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for them to not be regarded as property.37 Dawes saw this as a promising step, yet it is interesting 
to observe that this emphasized point of the inequality of the slaves with free, white individuals 
overrode any concerns he may have had regarding the increase in representation that the southern 
states would receive.  
There were others who made similar arguments as to the production of slaves in the 
South, yet such men had different intentions and were supportive of the representation aspect 
rather than that of taxation. At the Constitutional Convention, delegates clarified that the 
arguments over taxation dealt only with those that were direct and that anything that was 
indirect, such as imports and consumption, were not worthy of debate because these categories 
were nearly equal throughout the states. General Pinckney played off of this statement by 
expressing the ironic viewpoint that to not count slaves toward representation was insulting, 
because in a state such as South Carolina (his home state) where the exports for one year were 
nearly 600,000 pounds sterling this was directly a result of the slave labor. Pinckney stated that 
he only found it fair to count them towards representation for these efforts. If slaves were not to 
be counted equally for apportionment it would be ridiculous for the legislature to be able to tax 
exports.38 Clearly, there were other motives that are not stated here, for even though Pinckney 
claimed to want equal apportionment for the sake of the hard-working slaves it is more than 
likely that he simply wanted more southern delegates in the legislature to protect his material 
interests. Later in the discussion his cousin, Charles Pinckney, demonstrated matching beliefs on 
the subject when he described the notion that slaves contributed as much as anyone to the wealth 
of the nation because they were the peasants of the south. Since wealth directly impacts the 
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strength and defense of the nation, their efforts to supporting this end must be respected through 
proper apportionment.39 
The third main stance taken on this issue was that to count slaves toward representation 
would affect the regions of the nation in drastically different ways. James Wilson made this 
viewpoint clear in the early discussions over the Articles of Confederation. He thought that 
counting slaves for apportionment purposes would strictly benefit only the southern states while 
the northern states would bear the burden of defense. The Pennsylvania delegate went on to 
argue that although freemen did work more productively than slaves they also consumed much 
more than those in bondage who were given only the minimum necessities to live by, which led 
to a production surplus by slaves yet was not the case for the labor of free individuals.40 Such an 
argument was in response to that of John Adams, mentioned earlier, which held that slaves were 
essentially equal to the poor working class of the North. This notion continued to persist through 
the General Convention, as Rufus King made a similar point. King revealed that he had always 
expected the southern states to expect some sort of “respect” granted for their having more 
wealth than northerners, and he saw the desire to have slaves count towards representation as 
being an example of this.41 This demonstrates that the elite, southern slave holders utilized their 
social and economic status as a vehicle for achieving desired methods of counting the population 
for representation purposes. Delegates to the Convention, such as King, were aware of this, yet 
there was not much that could be done with the leverage held by the southern states in that they 
could always threaten to simply not join the union, which was something that the majority of 
men greatly wished to avoid. 
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Within this same line of thinking there were those who went a step further and found that 
counting slaves toward representation was not only to the benefit of the South and detriment of 
the North, but they had moral concerns about the issue as well. When writing about the debates 
on apportionment, Martin stated that it was urged by some at the Convention that there was no 
justification for counting the number of slaves toward these purposes. This was a result of the 
fact “that it involved the absurdity of increasing the power of a state in making laws for free men 
in proportion as that state violated the rights of freedom.”42 Going on, he said that it would also 
“make it the interest of the states to continue that infamous traffic” because the more slaves that 
were imported the more representatives the state would have.43 Gouverneur Morris recognized 
the dependence of the South on the institution of slavery, yet in regards to allowing them to 
count slaves as part of the population he became troubled. He made this clear when he said that 
he had come to the dilemma of determining whether to deliver injustice to the Southern States or 
to human nature, and he decided to go against the former. Morris could never bring himself to 
agree to count slaves toward representation because it would strongly encourage the further 
importation of slaves, and it was a system that must end. That being said, he did not expect that 
the Southern States would agree to such terms.  Views that were stressed in an effort to condemn 
the Three-Fifths Compromise, such as those above, were initially successful, and it lost in the 
first vote on the matter with 4 states in favor and 6 opposed.44  
While there were three main categories of opinion on the overall question of whether or 
not slaves should be counted towards representation and taxation, there was at the same time a 
great deal of discussion as to the potential of using a ratio system. In 1783 questions on the 
concept of counting slaves as only a fraction of a free individual began to become more pertinent 
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within the meetings of the Continental Congress under the Articles of Confederation. On 
February 27, 1783, John F. Mercer of Virginia provided an outline as to his vision for 
representation among the states, and suggested that each slave should count as half of a free 
man.45 This concept was not seriously debated again until representation was brought up a month 
later, on March 27. It was agreed by the members in session that these apportionments should not 
be determined according to age, as some had suggested, but that it needed to be a fixed number 
of the entire population. James Wilson, in clarifying why taxation and representation were based 
on land and not population in the first place, stated that he had been present when the Articles of 
Confederation were created, and that it had been a result of the “impossibility of compromising 
the different ideas of the Eastern and Southern States, as to the value of slaves compared with the 
whites.”46 However, the following day brought about a more specific debate on the issue of 
proportions of slaves for terms of apportionment, and a number of recommended figures were 
given. Several men suggested that the ratio should be four slaves counting as three freemen, yet 
there were others who asserted that the proper difference should be one to four.47 In order to 
come to a compromise James Madison recommended the ratio of slaves to freemen be five to 
three. The motion was seconded by John Rutledge, James Wilson gave his consent in favor of 
compromise, and the vote passed to propose an amendment to the states which would implement 
such an apportionment, yet it later fell two states short of ratification.48 Those who had been in 
favor of “rating slaves high” argued that they were much less expensive to feed and care for and 
that their “ingenuity” was inferior to others.49 On the other side of the argument, it was the 
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opinion that slaves should be counted low because their children do not get put to work as young 
as the children in “laboring families,” slaves are involved in labor not manufacturing, and that 
they did “as little as possible” because they had no interest in their work.50 
Although the motion for a three-fifths ratio failed to be ratified under the Continental 
Congress, the debate would once again come to the forefront over a series of days at the 
Philadelphia Convention in 1787. The issue was discussed in detail on July 11 and although it 
had been touched upon earlier, nearly two months into the debates it became one of the first 
matters taken up after the general framework and structure of government had been considered. 
Hugh Williamson of North Carolina brought forth the notion of counting every slave as three-
fifths of a freeman, and Edmund Randolph of Virginia expressed that he agreed with this 
proposition, as he believed that it would help to balance out representation between the different 
states.51 Pierce Butler and General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, both from South Carolina, then 
made it clear that they felt that slaves should be counted as equals for the purposes of 
representation, while there were still others such as Elbridge Gerry who insisted that three-fifths 
was the absolute maximum ratio that should be granted. Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts 
stated that when slaves were considered for purposes of taxation the delegates from the slave 
states did not wish to have blacks counted as equals, yet for representation they did. Seeing this 
trend, Gorham believed that three-fifths would be a just proportion. Butler then spoke out again 
to say that “the labor of a slave in South Carolina was as productive and valuable as that of a 
freeman in Massachusetts; that as wealth was the great means of defense and utility to the nation, 
they were equally valuable to it with freemen.”52 It was his opinion that the number of slaves 
should count toward apportionment. On this note George Mason asserted that he understood the 
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basis of such arguments. He knew that slaves were valuable to the economic capabilities of the 
nation and that the wealth they were a major part in generating could be used to strengthen the 
defense of the states, yet he could not bring himself to find it fair to consider slaves as equal for 
representation. Mason wished to see them counted in some manner, but to consider them equal to 
freemen was out of the question. The first motion was taken on the idea presented by Butler of 
counting slaves as equal, and it was struck down with the only states voting in favor being 
Delaware, South Carolina, and Georgia.53 
The conversation then turned to determining the key ingredient in terms of apportioning 
representation, and John Rutledge suggested that rather than focusing on number of inhabitants, 
wealth should be the pivotal factor. Delegate from Connecticut, Roger Sherman, refuted this by 
saying that population numbers should be the factor used, but that it should be subject to change 
by the legislative branch. In his opinion, the Constitution should define “the periods and the rule 
of revising the representation,” yet should leave some room for the legislature to make 
adjustments within these bounds.54 This notion of restricting the authority of this branch of 
government was unsettling to some members of the Convention such as George Read, George 
Mason, and James Wilson. Each of them followed by expressing that it would not be wise to set 
such binds and restriction on the legislature, but that they should be able to adjust the criteria for 
representation as they saw fit. Nathaniel Gorham agreed to some extent with Sherman in that if 
they could not come to a compromise at that particular time, why should the legislature be able 
to do so at a later point? There would continue to be biases and different ideals, so it was 
necessary for the Convention to fix some sort of standard.55 The debate continued as Gouverneur 
Morris provided a lengthy response which essentially pointed out that if the oaths, integrity, and 
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expectation of the legislature were not to be trusted in apportioning representation from time to 
time then there should be no government at all. Not being able to put faith in the representatives 
of the people would defeat the entire purpose of the system of authority that the Convention had 
assembled to create. Morris believed that the numbers of representation should be left to the 
legislature to decide periodically. James Madison delivered insight into the proceedings that had 
been taking place in a rejection of the statement by Morris. Madison said that any individual in a 
position of power cannot be fully trusted, and he desired to see a fixed proportion for 
representation and taxation in the Constitution, to avoid any foul play later on. Similar to the line 
of thinking that had been previously alluded to in the proceedings, it was a concern of Madison 
that the Western states would gradually become the most powerful, and to allow the legislature 
to change apportionment could work to that advantage while hurting the Eastern and Southern 
states. Finally, many had been asserting that taxation and representation should be separate, 
because the former was tied with wealth and the latter with inhabitants. Madison clarified that in 
most nations that proved to be perfectly valid as a result of consistencies in climate and 
opportunity, yet the variations of these elements in the United States made it impossible to 
separate the two. In his opinion, the inhabitants of a state directly demonstrated the wealth of the 
state because wherever labor yielded the most wealth was where most people would locate 
themselves.56  
The day wrapped up with a more specific look into whether or not slaves should be 
counted as three-fifths. Rufus King put forth a warning that if slaves were to be counted in any 
manner toward representation it would lead to discontent among the states not holding slaves. 
Roger Sherman argued that while counting slaves might not be just, he was satisfied with it 
because South Carolina “had no more beyond her proportion than New York and New 
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Hampshire.” Although Georgia had more slaves than whites, the state was rapidly growing and 
Sherman expected that this would not remain the case for long.57 It appears that Sherman was 
willing to allow for slaves to be utilized in apportioning representation as long as it acted to 
balance the number of legislative voices of each state. Pennsylvania delegate James Wilson was 
confused as to the whole argument as is made clear from the notes on July 11 which state: “Are 
they admitted as citizens—then why are they not admitted on an equality with white citizens? 
Are they admitted as property—then why is not other property admitted into the computation? 
These were difficulties, however, which he thought must be overruled by the necessity of 
compromise.”58 
As the debate continued, Oliver Ellsworth set forth a motion to have slaves be counted as 
three fifths for the time being so as to create a compromise, yet thought that the legislature 
should have the power to take a census and reapportion the numbers every certain amount of 
years. Edmund Randolph expressed that he agreed with the three fifths ratio, but did not want to 
allow the legislature to have to power to change the numbers because clearly there were such 
strong differences in opinion for the time being, and he did not see them as changing in the near 
future.59 In a statement of his main concern with creating a set number for taxation and 
representation which foreshadowed what would occur less than a century later, Rufus King 
expressed:  
“He must be shortsighted indeed who does not foresee that, whenever the 
Southern States shall be more numerous than the Northern, they can and will hold 
a language that will awe them into justice. If they threaten to separate now in case 
injury shall be done them, will their threats be less urgent or effectual when force 
                                                          
     57 Debates in the Federal Convention, 300.  
     58 Debates in the Federal Convention, 301.  
     59 Debates in the Federal Convention, 303-304.  
   
29 
 
shall back their demands? Even in the intervening period there will be no point of 
time at which they will not be able to say, Do us justice, or we will separate.”60 
King recognized the leverage that the southern states had, and demonstrated a grim outlook as to 
how there was no way of avoiding dealing with the issue of representation in a manner that 
appeased those states. 
Once the ratio of three-fifths was ultimately agreed upon at the General Convention, the 
question of ratification then went to the states. Delegates to the convention in Pennsylvania were 
relatively quick to pass the document, yet in the time they were in session the question of 
apportionment was discussed. On December 3, 1787, James Wilson, who was present at the 
Constitutional Convention and was now one of the leading figures of the ratification debates for 
his home state of Pennsylvania, essentially summed up that the leading concerns revolving 
around the institution of slavery were the three-fifths clause and the slave trade clause, as seems 
to be the trend throughout the state conventions. The latter will be examined later, yet in regards 
to the former he stated that the young nation had attempted to base representation and taxation in 
proportion to the value of land, yet it soon became clear that this was inefficient and basing these 
numbers off the population had been recommended as early as 1783.61 Although this method had 
not been adopted under the Articles of Confederation as a result of a failed ratification process, 
Wilson made clear that the men at the Convention had seen it appropriate to hold that such a 
manner of determining these numbers should now be utilized under the new government. This 
was basically Wilson’s way of informing his peers of the rationale behind the compromise and as 
a way of proclaiming that it would be fruitless to not ratify the Constitution over disagreements 
with that particular clause.  
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Finally, at the North Carolina Convention, William Lenoir brought up an interesting 
observation in terms of the military support which the state would be forced to provide in times 
of war. While apportionment was such an important topic of the times, Lenoir was curious as to 
why no one had questioned the way in which states were supposed to furnish troops for the 
federal army in times of war. Being that there was no provision in the Constitution, Lenoir 
assumed that the proposed three-fifths clause would also apply to the armed services. In stressing 
his point, Lenoir explained that North Carolina had 100,000 blacks. If a northern state had 
60,000 whites, North Carolina would have to send as many black troops to war than said state 
would have to send entirely and a percentage of the white population as well. This led him to the 
conclusion that such a manner of determining population for taxation and representation, when 
applied to the military as well, caused slaves to weaken a state rather than strengthen it.62 
Although this argument is used nowhere else, it is interesting to find that Lenoir found the three-
fifths clause to somewhat discourage the holding of slaves.  
There were a variety of opinions as to whether or not slaves should be counted toward 
apportionment in the House of Representatives and for purposes of direct taxation that were 
expressed in the critical years from 1777 through 1789 when the United States framework was 
being created. More often than not, it was the men from southern states such as South Carolina 
and Georgia who desired to have slaves be counted on an equal footing with freemen, although 
they were not fond of the taxation aspect of such a provision. On the other hand, members of 
New England and the Mid-Atlantic states generally believed that to count slaves toward the 
political voice of the South would be utterly ironic because slave holders considered their slaves 
as property. States such as Virginia, which was located in the Chesapeake region, tended to find 
a middle ground as a result of their owning a lot of slaves but also having a large population of 
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free individuals. To count slaves toward representation would strongly encourage the further 
importation and cultivation of blacks toward this system, which was one that most Virginia 
delegates did not wish to see expanded.  
After South Carolina and Georgia threatened that would never agree to form a union with 
the other states within which they would not gain seats in the House of Representatives through 
counting slaves toward their apportionment, attempts at compromise on the issue sprang forth. 
Ultimately, the decision to settle on the Three-Fifths Compromise as formally presented by 
James Wilson and Roger Sherman took place at the Constitutional Convention, and was installed 
into the first Article of the United States Constitution. Although many men disagreed with this 
concept on both ends, the northern and southern states believed that to become unified as one 
nation would be beneficial for purposes of defense, economy, and expansion. For the time being, 
sectional differences over slavery were not worth the risk of failing to ratify the Constitution, and 
it would have to be dealt with at a later date. 
Interestingly, this item which had largely been make-or-break in terms of coming to an 
agreement over the Constitution at the time of its framing was never of any serious issue 
following ratification. Whether it had been anticipated by some of the founders or not, the 
northern states where slavery was abolished or minimally used grew in population at a rate that 
far outweighed that of the slaveholding states. At the time of the General Convention, the overall 
population of the states holding a large number of slaves was nearly identical to that of the more 
northern states. This is made clear through the United States Census of 1790, in which the 
populations of Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia summed up to be 
1,797,187. The remainder of the original thirteen states (Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Rhode 
Island, New Hampshire, New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts) recorded in the same year 
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had a combined overall population of 1,785,213.63 While these numbers are nearly identical, the 
reason why many of the southern delegates desired to have slaves count toward representation 
was because when the number of blacks on record is deducted from those states the population 
drops to 1,128,768, whereas for the northern states the change is hardly worth mentioning. These 
figures shed light on why the three-fifths clause was such a topic of contention during the time of 
its creation. 
 Over the next seventy years, the boom in population in the non-slaveholding states was 
so dramatic that even if each slave counted as a whole individual rather than three-fifths of one 
the northern states would still have held much greater representation in the House. By 1820 the 
total population of the six slaveholding states mentioned previously had increased to just below 
three million, yet that of the seven more northern of the original thirteen states was nearing four 
million. The next few decades saw even more drastic changes, and by 1860 the numbers became 
staggering. Still only including the same thirteen states, the slaveholding regions had reached a 
total population of 4,772,511. Of that number 1,960,061 were black, which means that they were 
more than likely held in bondage. As for the northern states included in this original group, the 
population had skyrocketed to 9,650,891. With slavery having been made illegal in each of these 
states the total number of blacks, a mere 153,965, were all free. The urban growth and industrial 
developments of the northern states created extensively more job opportunities, which attracted a 
greater number of individuals. For the most part, besides those involved in the slave industry 
there were hardly any options down south, which partially accounts for this tremendous 
difference in population.64 
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At the General Convention the question on the relationship of slaves to representation 
and direct taxation was of great importance. Some delegates strongly believed that there was no 
doubt that slaves were considered as property to their owners and for that reason it was an absurd 
suggestion to count them towards apportionment. Others argued that these individuals were 
essentially the equivalent of the poor laboring class of the northern states, which entitled them to 
be included as part of the population. Still many possessed the view that counting slaves toward 
apportionment would encourage the institution to expand and place an increasing burden of 
defense on the states that were uninterested in growing their slave populations. Following the 
compromise on the ratio of three-fifths this issue quickly faded into irrelevancy. The North 
developed at an astoundingly faster rate which correlates with the population far outweighing 
that of the South as the nineteenth century progressed.  
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Chapter II 
Slave Trade Clause 
 
Article I, Section 9 which prohibited Congress from interfering with the slave trade until 
the year 1808, was another of the tremendously controversial slave-related clauses of the 
Constitution. It was inserted into the portion of the document which outlines the powers of 
Congress. One of these abilities was regulation of commerce, making the slave trade clause a 
blatant limitation of this authority. Taken out of context the intention of the provision may not be 
immediately clear as seen from the text: “The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of 
the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior 
to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight….”65 Although such explicit words as ‘slave’ 
were withheld, it was understood that it referred to individuals that were to be held in bondage 
and used for forced labor because it includes the word ‘importation.’ Further insight into the 
clause is revealed through examining the debates between the men who developed this section, 
in which the true meaning was not confined. By the time of the Philadelphia Convention a large 
number of states had already abolished further importation of slaves, including Virginia which 
had the greatest population of these individuals, yet there were two states that insisted that the 
national government should not have the power to declare an end to the trade: South Carolina 
and Georgia. Largely a result of the efforts of the delegates from these states, the provision was 
granted and compromise was made with Congress having the ability to levy a duty of up to £10 
on each slave that was brought into the nation as well as the right to abolish the trade beginning 
in 1808. The process of coming to such an agreement was not an easy one, and discussions 
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among the various states during the ratification process made this a major area of focus as well. 
Yet just as in the case of the three-fifths clause, this provision created no serious tension once it 
had been ratified. South Carolina and Georgia were able to import such a large quantity of slaves 
prior to 1808 that Congress shut down the international trade of this kind at their first 
opportunity, without opposition. Slaveholders continued to remain content in the years that 
followed the closing of the ports because of an extensive internal trade system and the naturally 
increasing slave population resulting from reproduction.  
There were three main categories for delegates both on the national and state level in 
regards to their stances on Article I, Section 9: those opposed, those who put personal beliefs 
aside in favor of what they considered best for the nation, and those who insisted on the 
continuation of the trade. In regards to the first category, these delegates put forth three main 
arguments as to why they found fault with the clause. First, these men asserted that it was 
ridiculous for Congress to be prohibited from taking action in this area until 1808, and at that 
point it was unlikely that they would do such a thing. The second notion was that the further 
importation of slaves would make the nation more vulnerable and weak. Those holding to the 
third stance were unnerved by the cruelness and immorality of the trade and the system it 
promoted. While there was clearly opposition to the clause, there were others who took a 
different approach. Whether they were against the slave trade in their own minds or simply 
indifferent, they put these personal notions aside in an attempt to look at the circumstance in the 
most positive light possible. There were two main ways the delegates went about this: either to 
view it as a step in the right direction because there had never before been even the possibility of 
a national abolition, or to recognize that without allowing the importation of slaves to continue 
there would be no unity between all the states under one central government. Finally, the only 
   
36 
 
individuals who openly favored this portion of the Constitution were delegates from South 
Carolina and Georgia, with the former being most influential in making clear that a lack of 
protection for the slave trade was something they could not do without.  
 One of the major areas of concern over the slave trade clause was that it was the only 
restriction on Congress in their regulation of commerce. Luther Martin, delegate from Maryland, 
cited this section of the document as being one of the reasons he left the General Convention and 
refused to sign. In a letter to the Speaker of the House of Delegates in his home state, he stressed 
that it was ridiculous that such a provision was to be implemented when in reference to the 
power of Congress over commerce he wrote: “…it must therefore appear to the world absurd and 
disgraceful, to the last degree, that we should except from the exercise of that power the only 
branch of commerce which is unjustifiable in its nature, and contrary to the rights of mankind.”66 
Clearly, such a distinction rightly deserved such questioning as the founding document of the 
nation explicitly withheld the legislative branch from interfering with the human traffic. Along 
the same lines was the concern expressed by Rufus King at the Philadelphia Convention that if 
the slave trade was going to be protected there should at least be a limit on the number of 
individuals that were to be imported. On top of this, he found more fault with the lack of a 
provision for exports to be taxed. Without one, or preferably both, of these assurances it was 
King’s belief that production and importation would have no limits.67 
Another gloomy yet realistic concern was that the year 1808 would not necessarily bring 
with it the abolition of slave importation. This issue came up at the Ratification Debate of New 
Hampshire when Joshua Atherton spoke his mind before the other delegates. He thought that the 
state should not pass the Constitution as long as it protected slavery and warned that even in 
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1808: “Congress may be as much, or more, puzzled to put a stop to it then, than we are now. The 
clause has not secured its abolition.”68 This highlights the subtle fact that Article I, Section 9 
does not state that Congress ‘must’ or ‘will’ put an end to the trade, rather it simply says that 
they will not be able to alter it until a twenty-year period has passed. This lack of a guarantee 
was observed by Luther Martin as well. Not only did he express concern, but he even went so far 
as to write that it was his belief that if the slave trade were to continue until 1808 it would not be 
abolished afterwards.69 These doubts were certainly not unwarranted, for if the slave trade was 
such a major point of contention in 1787 who was to say that twenty years more utilization of the 
system would make it any easier for those who desired to import slaves to part with it? 
Interestingly, both Atherton and Martin happened to be on the same page in regards to this issue 
as a delegate to the ratification debates of South Carolina. Robert Gibbes Barnwell expressed to 
his peers that they should not be upset over the potential for Congress to interfere with the slave 
trade in 1808 because it did not require that such actions would take place. According to 
Barnwell, unless South Carolina was to end the importation of slaves on their own, “…the traffic 
for negroes will continue forever.”70 With a twenty year window in which to operate, Barnwell 
believed that the production and exportation of states using slave labor would greatly benefit the 
nation, and that the states would realize this and not abolish the trade.  
Another argument made against the provisions of the slave trade clause was that 
increasing the number of slaves within the states directly increased the amount of risk which the 
nation faced. The main proponent of this viewpoint was George Mason, delegate from Virginia 
to the Constitutional Convention. In much the same way as Martin, Mason refused to sign the 
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Constitution and wrote a letter stating his reasons for the same. In his explanation he pointed out 
that he found fault with the slave trade clause because “such importations render the United 
States weaker, more vulnerable, and less capable of defence.”71 This was a reiteration of what he 
had explained to his peers at the Convention during the month of August when he cited a variety 
of reasons as to the danger of further importation. Mason stated that had the British army utilized 
the slaves of the colonies in the manner that he believed they could have then it would have been 
devastating for the Revolution. Going on he described how other cultures, namely Sicily and 
Greece, had experienced violent insurrections. Following these warnings, Mason stressed that 
states such as Virginia and Maryland had taken the steps to abolish the trade into their ports, but 
that if South Carolina and Georgia were to continue the traffic then the efforts of these other 
states would be defeated. The westward expansion of the nation and the desire of the settlers of 
these new lands to have slaves meant that as long as these two states were permitted to continue 
importing them, slaves would be sold throughout the country. On top of all this, Mason believed 
that slave labor discouraged poor individuals from working because they did not want to be hired 
for similar tasks to what slaves were subject to. This in turn led to a decrease in the immigration 
of whites, which the Virginia delegate thought was the true way to strengthen the nation.72  
A similar viewpoint was held by fellow delegate and Governor from Virginia, Edmund 
Randolph, who discussed the issue during the ratification debates of his home state. It was his 
belief that if any states continued to import slaves there would be more and more of these 
individuals being funneled into his home state. Randolph acknowledged that such activity would 
add to the weakness of the Virginia every day, and while he wanted the peculiar institution to 
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continue he did not wish for the importation of slaves to be allowed.73 The reason for such 
concern by the men from Virginia resulted from their state having the largest population of 
slaves at the time. They recognized the potential threat of a widespread insurrection and for that 
reason wanted to prohibit further increase in the slave population. While an aura of danger came 
with these large numbers, there was at the same time a benefit. Such a vast population led to a lot 
of reproduction, which provided slaveholders with a continued supply of labor. General Charles 
Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina recognized that Virginia’s aversion to the slave trade 
stemmed from simple supply and demand market principles. If the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade 
were to be abolished then the value of the slaves from Virginia would increase, and slaveholders 
residing within that state would be able to make large profits through selling to other states.74 
The delegates from Virginia were mostly concerned with the safety and interests of their own 
region, yet from an outside perspective it was recognized as a burden for the rest of the nation. 
Luther Martin argued at the General Convention that all states which utilized slavery weakened 
the nation and that the rest of the states were obligated to protect them. As a result, any further 
importation of slaves was simply unfair to those states which abstained.75 
The third most common argument against the prohibition of Congress to interfere with 
the slave trade for twenty years was that it was an inhumane process that was highly immoral. 
This notion was greatly stressed in the ratification debates of Massachusetts, in which various 
delegates spoke their mind on the matter. One delegate stated that he would never be able to put 
his hand to something that made “merchandise of the bodies of men,” and that unless the clause 
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was removed from the Constitution he would refuse to ratify.76 Such words evoked General 
Thompson to exclaim his shock that even though George Washington was “immortalized” the 
fact that he continued to hold slaves dropped his character by fifty-percent.77 This notion was 
observed in the New Hampshire debates when the delegates were strongly urged not to ratify the 
Constitution because doing so would make them accomplices in “the sin and guilt of this 
abominable traffic.”78 Such concerns were echoed by George Mason during the Philadelphia 
Convention. He warned those present that nations are punished for their misdeeds and that if the 
states were to continue on this path through increasing slavery they would bring the “judgment 
of Heaven” upon themselves.79 Others attempted to emphasize their concerns with the 
immorality of the trade through tapping into the emotions of their peers. Major Lusk gave a 
vivid, heart-wrenching description of Africans who were kidnapped from their homes and sold 
into the horrible, miserable world of slavery.80 Although these arguments against the immorality 
and cruelness of the trade and slavery as a whole are extremely convincing today, at the time of 
the founding they were not nearly as effective.  
Related to the above views was the notion that the importation of slaves and the system it 
promoted were a stark contrast to the ideals upon which the nation was to stand. General 
Thompson was baffled as to how slavery could be provided for in the Constitution considering 
the principles under which the Revolution was fought.81 This paradox upset Luther Martin as 
well, and he made this clear in speaking at the General Convention. Not only did he find it to be 
a strong inconsistency with American values, but Martin saw it as a stain on the character of the 
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nation.82 Opinions such as this are hard to look past considering the importance of the concepts 
of equality and natural rights that are found in the Declaration of Independence and were a 
driving force behind the desire to break away from England; a country that did not allow slavery 
within its borders. To gain freedom and then to write a founding document which protected the 
peculiar institution was mind-boggling to a great number of people. John Dickinson of Delaware 
was one such individual, and at the Federal Convention he made clear his belief that to have the 
importation of slaves protected in the Constitution was absurd. The fact that even though Great 
Britain and France permitted slavery in their territories but would not allow it in the homeland 
was a sign that Dickinson wanted the other delegates to be aware of. In developing the founding 
document he stressed that it should be taken into account what will make the citizens happiest, 
and continuing to promote slavery was not in their best interest.83  
Just as there were a variety of arguments against Article I, Section 9, of the Constitution, 
there were others who decided to take the position of looking at it from a broader perspective in 
an effort to see things in the most positive light possible. Reverend Isaac Backus was a supporter 
of this line of thinking as seen through his statements at the debates over ratification for 
Massachusetts. Making it a point to declare that he was the most opposed to slavery out of any 
man in the nation, he then requested that his peers look at the context within which they were 
hoping to rid the country of the institution. Reverend Backus believed that they should count 
their blessings by recognizing that the Articles of Confederation contained no provisions in 
regards to slavery, and now under the proposed Constitution there was at least the assurance that 
in 1808 the national government could potentially abolish the importation and that for the time 
being each state could decide individually. On top of this Reverend Backus asserted that “slavery 
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grows more and more odious through the world.”84 It was his view that, in one way or another, 
the institution of slavery would fade out within the United States in one way or another. This 
opinion was shared with his fellow delegate, Thomas Dawes, who in response to those objecting 
to the slave trade clause asserted that the Convention had done as much as they could in regards 
to this subject. To abolish the slave trade or the institution as a whole would hurt their “southern 
brethren,” but the steps that had been taken had provided a blow to slavery and it would 
eventually “die of consumption.”85 Other delegates to the Massachusetts debates over ratification 
shared in this notion, and some went so far as to say that the slave trade clause was one of the 
best portions of the Constitution because it provided grounds for future, total abolition of the 
importation of slaves. There was a trust that each individual state would soon prohibit the traffic 
on their own, making it possible for it to be obsolete prior to 1808.86  
Another position taken by those who were willing to accept the slave trade clause was 
that it was a necessary compromise in order to form a union. Delegates to the ratification debates 
of North Carolina talked extensively about this issue as a result of their being on the fence 
concerning the matter. Richard Dobbs Spaight explained to his peers that there had been a 
“contest between the Northern and Southern States” at the Convention.87 The former had desired 
to see the importation of slaves removed completely while the latter depended on slave labor in 
order to survive. Spaight mentioned that South Carolina and Georgia had insisted on having the 
clause included in the document because they needed to enlarge their supply of slaves, and that 
twenty years would be sufficient to meet this need. Resulting from the fact that North Carolina 
had not yet abolished the slave trade within their own state, Spaight and his fellow delegates to 
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the Convention believed that they were unauthorized to side with the North in favor of total 
prohibition.88 In support of this information, James Iredell said that the majority of the nation as 
well as the delegates in Philadelphia would love to see the slave trade abolished, but South 
Carolina and Georgia would never agree to it. Although it was a minimum of twenty years away, 
he thought it a tremendous achievement that any sort of provision for ending the importation of 
slaves on a national level had been included in the founding document.89 It is clear from 
reviewing these opinions that the compromise found in the slave trade clause was put in place in 
order to greatly strengthen the chance of unifying the states. Refusing to appease South Carolina 
and Georgia in at least some fashion would have certainly resulted in a failure of those two states 
to ratify the Constitution.  
There was another state whose delegates to the General Convention held the position that 
it was much more pertinent for the founding document to be ratified rather than to worry about 
the issue of the slave trade. Two of the delegates from Rhode Island made it a point to speak out 
on this matter, beginning with Roger Sherman. He expressed his opinion that since it was not 
required to ensure the public good that the importation of slaves be stopped and because states 
already had the right to prohibit the trade if they so desired, they should do no more than what 
was found in the clause as it currently stood. Sherman went on to state that slavery seemed to be 
on its way out already, and it was only a matter of time before it vanished. With these 
considerations in mind he believed that the Constitution should be made to be ratified quickly, as 
unity was essential.90 Fellow delegate, Oliver Ellsworth, conveyed his opinion that if they 
abolished the slave trade outright then they “ought to go further, and free those already in the 
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country.”91 He made the point that Virginia and Maryland did not need the importation of slaves 
because they reproduced so quickly in those states that it would be a waste of money to continue 
in the international trade. As for South Carolina and Georgia, they needed to continue importing, 
so anything preventing that would injure those two states alone.92 It is interesting to note that, 
other than South Carolina and Georgia, the two states that were most outspoken in terms of 
wanting to prevent the harm of these states and desired to leave the clause in the final draft of the 
Constitution to ensure a speedy ratification were North Carolina and Rhode Island. The former 
borders one of the states that would continue importing, so if they desired to buy any slaves it 
would not be difficult for them to do without needing to open their own ports. As for Rhode 
Island, they had been heavily involved in the slave trade in the years leading up to the 
Convention, and if they had interest in reopening their ports in order to again profit off of such 
traffic they would need to avoid a national abolition of the trade.  
The final major stance taken on the issue of the slave trade provision existing within the 
Constitution was insisting that protection against a national abolition, at least for a time, be 
granted. Those who argued on behalf of this position were the delegates from South Carolina and 
Georgia, with the former being at the forefront of the debate. What went on behind the closed 
doors of the legislative debates of South Carolina presents the rationale behind the strong 
position taken by the delegates of that state at the Constitutional Convention. Rawlins Lowndes 
essentially provided a summary to this as well as his reaction to the slave trade clause as seen in 
this transcription taken during his statement:  
“Without negroes, this state would degenerate into one of the most contemptible 
in the Union; and he an expression that fell from General Pinckney on a former 
debate, that whilst there remained one acre of swamp-land in South Carolina, he 
should raise his voice against restricting the importation of negroes. Even in 
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granting the importation for twenty years, care had been taken to make us pay for 
this indulgence, each negro being liable, on importation, to pay a duty not 
exceeding ten dollars; and, in addition to this, they were liable to a capitation tax. 
Negroes were our wealth, our only natural resource; yet behold how our kind 
friends in the north were determined soon to tie up our hands, and drain us of 
what we had!”93 
The sheer dependence on the institution of slavery in that particular state is made clear through 
such a statement. Climate and landscape made the settling of South Carolina tremendously 
difficult, and it was even more challenging to develop an economy. In the eyes of many the use 
of forced labor for purposes such as growing and harvesting rice was the only way in which the 
state could be of any worth. These circumstances led the delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention to be unrelenting on the issue of the slave trade.  
 While they had made it clear throughout the Convention, towards the end of August 
when discussions on the slave trade clause began to become increasingly heated, South Carolina 
and Georgia began to be explicit on their position. Charles Pinckney, cousin of General Charles 
Cotesworth Pinckney, told the other delegates that South Carolina would never be able to ratify 
anything that prohibited the importation of slaves. He went on to state that he and the other 
delegates from his home state had been keeping their eye on all powers that were being given to 
Congress in order to be sure to avoid anything that would interfere with the institution. That 
being said, Pinckney declared that if the states be left alone to make their own decision on the 
matter, over time his state may decide to abolish the trade.94 As the debate continued the 
following day, General Pinckney elaborated on what his cousin and fellow delegate had stated 
previously. In order to demonstrate just how impossible it would be to have the Constitution 
ratified by South Carolina without a protection for the slave trade he remarked that he firmly 
believed that even if he and the other delegates were to sign the document and using their 
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“personal influence” upon returning home, the rest of their peers would refuse to ratify it.95 Such 
undeniable statements did not bring an end to the debate, and seemingly irritated at this John 
Rutledge of South Carolina further stressed the point: “If the Convention thinks that North 
Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, will ever agree to the plan, unless their right to import 
slaves be untouched, the expectation is vain. The people of those states will never be such fools 
as to give up so important an interest.”96  
Whether in an attempt to sway the disagreeing delegates, an expression of true personal 
beliefs, or a combination of the two, there were two intriguing arguments made by the delegates 
from South Carolina as to how the importation and enslavement of Africans was justifiable. 
Charles Pinckney responded to claims that slavery be immoral through the suggestion that if it 
was considered wrong, it had been “justified by the example of all the world.”97 Going on, he 
cited various examples in an effort to make the point that half of the population of the world has 
always been a slave throughout history.98 Although this was a gross overstatement, he was 
correct to the extent that slavery has existed on different levels for the majority of time. General 
Pinckney sought to provide rationale for the institution from an economic standpoint. To be sure, 
permitting South Carolina to indulge in the traffic would lead to more production, more trade of 
goods, and more consumption. This, in the eyes of Pinckney, would then add “more revenue to 
the national treasury.”99 
 Perhaps as a result of the delegates of South Carolina being extremely vocal or maybe 
some other reason, the Georgia delegates to the Constitutional Convention were much quieter in 
the debates over the slave trade clause. However, in a statement from Abraham Baldwin, an 
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intriguing viewpoint is expressed. Baldwin explains that it was his understanding that the 
gathering was to deal with issues that were of a national scale. It was the opinion of Georgia that 
slavery and the slave trade “were of a local nature.”100 His home state had been suspicious that 
the central states desired to create a national government so that they could “have a vortex for 
every thing,” and being far from this middle-region Georgia would then be at a disadvantage.101 
In light of this, Baldwin believed that it should come as no surprise that he would see an attempt 
at abolishing the slave trade as being an effort to further remove Georgia from having power 
within the national government. Just as the delegates of his neighboring state had declared, 
Baldwin expressed that if the question of the slave trade be left up to the states, Georgia might 
bring an end to the cruel system of importing slaves.102 Although the argument was for the most 
part unique in comparison with that of South Carolina, the bottom line was clear – if the issue of 
the slave trade was not protected from abolition by Congress and the question was not left to the 
states, the southernmost entities would not join the union.  
 Most scholars on this subject tend to convey the similar opinion that South Carolina and 
Georgia would have acted on the threats they made at the Convention had the slave trade not 
been permitted or the system protected by certain provisions within the Constitution, yet it is 
worth mentioning the differing opinion of Gary B. Nash on this subject. In the book Race and 
Revolution, Nash refutes the notion that these states would have refused to ratify the Constitution 
if the peculiar institution had not been protected within it. The author claims that these two 
southernmost states were too weak to not join the union; namely as a result of their vulnerability 
through being so close to the Creek confederacy and Spanish-inhabited Florida.103 South 
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Carolina and Georgia needed the rest of the states in order to survive to a much greater extent 
than did the rest of the states need South Carolina and Georgia, asserts Nash, and for these 
reasons the threats made by the delegates from these locations at the Constitutional Convention 
were essentially empty. This is certainly a valid argument, as the dangers that would have been 
faced by the two states had they failed to join the union would have been tremendous. However, 
any opinion on the situation consists of speculation, as slavery was protected within the 
document and the southernmost states did ratify. Whether one holds the notion that the two states 
would have lived up to their threats or shares in the opinion presented by Nash, the bottom line is 
that the claims made by South Carolina and Georgia at the Convention were sufficient enough to 
ensure that their demands were met, and it was never revealed whether they would have actually 
acted upon them or not.  
 Ultimately, South Carolina and Georgia got what they wanted with the slave trade clause, 
but it came after a great deal of debate. For being a topic of such intense argument in 1787, it 
may be surprising that it posed no major problems in the years following the ratification of the 
Constitution. From 1789 until 1808, Congress was prohibited from doing anything to interfere 
with the traffic, so there was not much that could be done even if it had been desired. At the end 
of that period the legislative branch enacted its powers and ended the legal importation of slaves 
into the United States, yet even this did not cause controversy. This had much to do with the fact 
that during the roughly twenty-year window in which the international slave trade was untouched 
the states of South Carolina and Georgia successfully imported enough individuals to meet the 
satisfaction of their slaveholders. South Carolina alone brought in around 100,000 slaves through 
its ports during this timeframe and the population of forced laborers within these states had 
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climbed extensively.104 According to the census records, the black population in this state nearly 
doubled from just below 110,000 in 1790 to 200,919 by 1810. Georgia experienced similar 
changes in demographics by growing from a population of roughly 30,000 blacks to 107,019 
during the twenty-year span.105 While it is not stated whether or not these individuals were 
slaves, it is safe to assume that the overwhelming majority of them were not free. Such major 
increases make clear the immense undertaking in regards to utilization of the international slave 
trade before it was outlawed.  
 Not only did the efforts between 1787 and 1808 help to limit any further debate over the 
issue of importing slaves, but the vast amount of internal traffic of this kind played a key role as 
well. As the population of slaves grew so did the levels of reproduction, which essentially 
created a self-sustaining supply of labor for many slaveholders. For others, excess numbers were 
achieved and the domestic slave trade began to take-off. This was especially true of the 
Chesapeake Region, namely Virginia, as the number of slaves in that state was almost beyond 
what could be maintained. In the decade following the end of the ability to legally import slaves 
into the United States it is estimated that around 120,000 slaves were transported to the West and 
South from this region of the nation, and Georgia was one of the main recipients.106 With the 
widespread availability of new laborers, there was no pressing reason for the states to call for a 
re-opening of the coastline for importing slaves. In fact, South Carolina and Georgia were able to 
achieve such high numbers by the 1830s that instead of constantly wanting more these states 
“each forwarded nearly 100,000 slaves” to Alabama and Mississippi.107 Not only was this an 
interstate traffic, but slaves were commonly sold from city to city, town to town, or region to 
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region within the same state.108 With the ability to obtain new laborers being readily available at 
home, there was no longer a widespread lust for the international slave trade. It is clear that up 
until 1808 there were no major controversies on the issue because it had already been agreed to 
in the Constitution, and following its end in 1808 slaveholders had little reason to call for a 
reopening.   
 The extensive network of the domestic slave trade was never seriously considered as 
something that Congress would attempt to limit or terminate. This is an action that the legislative 
branch certainly had the power to do, for in Article I, Section 8 they are granted authority over 
interstate commerce. Perhaps Congress did not want to upset those involved with the system and 
potentially provoke them to call for the ports to be reopened for importation, or the tremendous 
obstacle of enforcing such a regulation seemed overwhelming, but for one reason or another this 
power never came close to being exercised. If this had occurred there is the possibility that issues 
surrounding the slave trade clause would have been aroused and tension would have ensued, yet 
this simply was not the case. While the debates of 1787 demonstrated that there were those 
severely opposed to the traffic, those who put their personal beliefs aside in order to do what they 
perceived as best for the nation, and others who absolutely insisted on its protection, this 
provision proved to provide no serious level of turmoil in subsequent years.  
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Chapter III 
Fugitive Slave Clause 
 
In regards to the questions surrounding slavery at the time of the Constitutional 
Convention, the main debates focused on the two issues discussed in chapters one and two: the 
three-fifths clause and the slave trade clause. As made evident, among the framers there were a 
wide variety of strong opinions on each of these topics, and coming to compromise was no 
simple task. In contrast, the third main provision of the Constitution concerning slavery was not 
even debated. Article IV, Section 2, or what is commonly referred to as the fugitive slave clause, 
was essentially thrown in as an afterthought while the finishing touches were being put on the 
founding document of the United States. While no form of the word ‘slave’ is included in the 
actual text, it is quite obvious that the clause is in reference to runaways as it reads: “No Person 
held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in 
Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but 
shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.”109  
Within the portion of the document in which it is included this provision is practically hidden as 
it is located between Section 1 which grants “Full Faith and Credit” to the states in regards to 
records of public acts and judicial proceedings and Section 3 which outlines the process by 
which new states shall be admitted into the union.110 Such a brief statement that saw no debate 
among the founding fathers proved to be the most controversial of the three slave-related clauses 
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in the years immediately following the General Convention and peaking during the antebellum 
period. It was the basis of two national laws passed by Congress, one of the major U.S. Supreme 
Court cases of the nineteenth century, and it assisted in increasing the sectional tension between 
the northern and southern states.  
 The Philadelphia Convention lasted from May 14 – September 17, 1787, and nearly 
every provision of what would become the Constitution was debated for a considerable amount 
of time, yet discussion of the topic of fugitive slaves was completely taken care of by the 
delegates in a matter of a few moments. On August 28, South Carolina delegates Pierce Butler 
and Charles Pinckney asserted that in regards to an article involving individuals who had 
committed a crime it should be added that “fugitive slaves and servants [are] to be delivered up 
like criminals.”111 This demonstrates the opinion of slaveholders that a runaway slave should be 
treated in the same manner as a criminal, and they sought to use such rationale as insurance 
against the loss of their human property. James Wilson of Pennsylvania found fault with this 
proposition because he opposed the idea of the states being forced to use expenses to ensure the 
return of fugitive slaves. The only other opinion offered in response to the suggestion came from 
Roger Sherman of Connecticut, who stated that he “saw no more propriety in the public seizing 
and surrendering a slave or servant than a horse.”112 As made clear through these two simple 
statements, these delegates saw it as an annoyance for the northern states that they should be 
forced to utilize time, effort, and resources in order to support slavery. Perhaps wanting to avoid 
an in-depth debate on the suggestion or simply recognizing that using the word ‘slave’ was an 
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error, Butler withdrew his proposition for the time being in order to attempt to insert the 
provision somewhere else in the document.113 
 It did not take long for Butler to find this opportunity. The following day, August 29, the 
South Carolinian declared his revised version of the proposition. The word ‘slave’ had been 
omitted, and it was nearly identical to the wording of the clause as it was phrased upon being 
written into the Constitution. Unlike the previous attempt, no one spoke out against it (or in 
support of it), and it was agreed upon unanimously.114 There are several possibilities as to how 
the fugitive slave clause was hardly of any concern, and what little there was had only been 
mentioned briefly, and then ceased to be expressed upon a second effort by its supporters. It may 
be that the delegates did not find it to be an issue significant enough to spend time on in 
comparison with the other matters that were at hand. In the overall scheme of attempting to 
found a nation it may not have seemed to make much of a difference whether or not runaway 
slaves were to be returned. Another potential reason for the lack of discussion is that to 
southerners it was a supposed guarantee that if they lawfully reclaimed a fugitive slave it was to 
be returned to them, while to northerners they did not need to do anything more than comply 
with such an event. Still another possibility is that the delegates had grown tired of struggling to 
draft the Constitution throughout the course of over three months, and would rather approve of 
what they saw as a minor detail than lengthen the duration of the Convention. Finally, the view 
that slaves were inferior and incapable of any serious attempt to create change contributed as 
well.  
 Such reasoning behind the lack of attention paid to the provision may very well have 
played a role, yet the most significant argument that can be made pertains to the Northwest 
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Ordinance of 1787. As the Constitutional Convention was taking place the Congress of the 
Confederation was continuing to function. On July 13, 1787, this body passed the ordinance 
which outlined the regulations for the territories as well as the requirements that must be met for 
states to be formed and join the Union. The portion that helps to better understand the lack of 
reaction to the fugitive slave clause is found in Article 6, which outlaws slavery in the territories. 
It goes on to provide that anyone “from whom labor or service is lawfully claimed in any one of 
the original States” may be reclaimed and returned.115 With this provision being created while 
the General Convention was in session, it is safe to assume that it played a role in limiting the 
discussion on the inclusion of such in the Constitution. Although it is impossible to know what 
went on behind closed doors or was not included in the notes that were made public, there is 
even the likelihood that there was an overreaching agreement among the delegates to 
compromise over the Northwest Ordinance and Constitution, as some scholars have 
suggested.116  
As pointed to in the chapters on the three-fifths clause and slave trade clause, had it not 
been for those two compromises it is likely that the Union would never have formed, or at least 
not one that included all thirteen of the original states. While there is evidence for this argument 
contained within the debates that took place, such as the delegates from South Carolina blatantly 
expressing that their state would not join a Union that did not protect the slave trade, such 
assertions cannot be made in reference to the fugitive slave clause. There was hardly a discussion 
on the issue, no threats were made as to the necessity of such a provision, and there was not even 
an attempt at compromise. Taking this into consideration it is clear that it was nothing more than 
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a last-minute desire of certain southerners and was not given much thought by northerners. It is 
highly ironic to note this observation because, out of the three pivotal arguments involving 
slavery that were present when the founding fathers drafted the Constitution, the two that were 
essentially make-or-break issues in 1787 would barely be of any concern on a national scale 
throughout the duration of their existence, while the one that was overlooked proved to be by far 
the most controversial. To put it another way, the two topics that were hotly debated in order to 
avoid and limit controversy and provide unity were undermined by the provision which the 
founding fathers never perceived as generating serious tension. Factors such as the growth and 
expansion of slavery through invention of the cotton gin and the domestic slave trade, as well as 
the will of slaves to constantly run away might explain why the framers underestimated how 
often this topic would create tension, yet there is no question that it certainly did just that.  
 The first way in which strain began to build over the fugitive slave clause came not long 
after the ratification of the Constitution. On February 12, 1793, the United States Congress 
passed its first Fugitive Slave Act, which was formally titled “An Act respecting fugitives from 
justice, and persons escaping from the service of their masters.”117 While the Constitution had 
given slaveholders the right to reclaim their escaped slaves it had not created any rules or 
regulations by which such action was to take place. This piece of legislation was divided into 
four parts, with the latter two pertaining to the handling of fugitive slaves. If a slave were to 
escape from a slaveholder in a state or territory and make it to a free state, the owner had the 
right to seize them. Next, the master needed to bring the runaway before a judge of a United 
States District or Circuit Court, or if they desired they could go “before any magistrate of a 
                                                          
     117 “Annals of Congress, 2nd Congress, 2nd Session,” in A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S. 
Congressional Documents and Debates, 1774-1875, 1414. Retrieved from <http://memory.loc.gov/>.  
   
56 
 
county, city, or town corporate” where the capture had been made.118 Upon an oral testimony or 
legal warrant from their hometown the master was able to testify and then it was up to the 
official to determine whether or not the slave lawfully belonged to the individual. The second 
provision placed a five hundred dollar fine on anyone who sought to interfere with this 
system.119 Prior to this law there had been no restrictions against helping runaway slaves or any 
requirements as to how the procedure could take place. Imposing such regulations on those who 
were opposed to the institution of slavery was upsetting to many; not to mention that a simple 
oral testimony was all that was necessary for a master claiming an individual as his escaped 
slave.  
The controversy over this legislation came to the national forefront in a major United 
States Supreme Court case in 1842. Following the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, 
many free states found fault with the provisions contained therein and created their own rules 
and regulations regarding the process by which an accused runaway might be returned. 
Pennsylvania was no exception to this trend, as the state legislature required that a justice of the 
peace, judge, or magistrate grant a certificate of removal before an accused fugitive slave could 
be taken away by their captors.120 This was essentially the same as the provision found in the 
Constitution, but a simple oral testimony was not sufficient evidence in the eyes of Pennsylvania. 
Such requirements created problems for Edward Prigg when he and the members of his crew 
were unable to provide documentation that Margaret Morgan and her children belonged to his 
neighbor in Maryland. The fact that Margaret was married to a free black man and had resided in 
Pennsylvania her entire life, giving birth to at least one child there, generated suspicions that the 
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lack of documentation heightened.121 Prigg and the rest of his party then decided to simply take 
the Morgan family back to Maryland, and as a result they were charged with kidnapping. The 
defense claimed that it was the constitutional right of Prigg to be able to capture and remove the 
Morgans from freedom back into bondage, and the case was brought before the highest court in 
the nation.  
 As attention to the case was spreading throughout the nation on a topic that was already 
controversial the outcome was sure to be dramatic, and it certainly was. Justice Joseph Story 
delivered the Opinion of the Court that ruled the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 constitutional, but 
then continued to take it much further. Of the other aspects of the ruling the most shocking were 
that no state could pass any laws which added greater restrictions to the capture or removal of 
runaway slaves, slaveholders and their agents were able to return fugitive slaves to their home 
state without following any specific guidelines, and that runaways did not possess the right to 
due process.122 In other words, this granted anyone who so desired the right to seize a black 
person in the north and bring them to a slave state where they would be kept in bondage. In an 
effort to appease both northerners and southerners, Justice Story included that state officials were 
recommended but could not be “compelled to enforce” the process of capturing and returning 
runaways.123 This inspired many northern states to pass laws which ordered officials to not 
participate and prohibited the use of state facilities. A major part of the rationale for Justice 
Story’s ruling was based on the belief that the fugitive slave clause was of profound importance 
and must be adhered to. He made this clear by wrongly stating that: “… it cannot be doubted that 
it (fugitive slave clause) constituted a fundamental article, without the adoption of which the 
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Union could not have been formed.”124 This was an errant notion because, as mentioned 
previously, this provision was not debated and was thrown into the Constitution as somewhat of 
an after-thought. Prigg v. Pennsylvania certainly did much in regards to validating and 
expanding regulations surrounding fugitive slaves, but this was not the last time that the issue 
would present itself in a national manner. 
 Surprisingly, the ruling in Prigg upset southerners more than northerners because they 
were aggravated by the fact that state officials in free states did not have to participate in the 
process. Many believed that “the law was flagrantly ignored in the North,” which led to even 
greater concern among slaveholders.125 With the issue of fugitive slaves playing a role in the 
increasing tensions between the two sections of the nation, Congress attempted to alleviate the 
situation through the creation of a new Fugitive Slave Act, which was part of the overall 
Compromise of 1850. As if the clause in the Constitution, law of 1793, and ruling by the 
Supreme Court were not pro-slavery enough, this new act was undoubtedly so. Under the new 
law, all marshals and deputy marshals were required to arrest anyone suspicious of being a 
fugitive slave, and to assist in executing warrants. Failure to comply with any of the provisions 
resulted in a one thousand dollar fine. Slaveholders and their agents were permitted to obtain a 
warrant from the courts and then capture an accused runaway, or could first seize the individual 
then bring them before a judge and provide testimony. The accused were denied the right of due 
process, and any citizen who was found obstructing the process in any way was subject to up to a 
one thousand dollar fine and six months in prison.126 Another aspect of the act was that a judge 
or commissioner who was responsible for determining the status of an accused runaway would 
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receive five dollars for ruling them to be free and ten if they found them to be a fugitive.127 This 
act alarmed northerners, but it is estimated that in the ten years following its passing a mere three 
hundred fifty of ten thousand fugitive slaves were actually returned to their masters, which 
caused many southerners to more intensely believe that the law was neglected in the North.128 
So, while it was anticipated that the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 would play a part in easing the 
tensions between the sections of the nation, in reality it did just the opposite as growing angers 
soon burst into a violent conflict known as the American Civil War.  
 This viewpoint has been thoroughly explored by historian James Oakes who expressed 
his arguments in the article, “The Political Significance of Slave Resistance.” Oakes suggests 
that fugitive slaves directly impacted the political spectrum of the United States through their 
efforts by highlighting the sectional differences between the northern and southern states. During 
the “fugitive slave crisis,” or the period in which tensions over the issue were building, the 
runaway slaves were able to expose the conflicting laws of the two sections of the country.129 
While the free states had created Personal Liberty Laws and the southern states had pushed for 
the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, if it had not been for slaves actually running away in large 
numbers, then the different stances would not have mattered. Yet through their efforts, they 
“created a potential for sectional conflict every time a slave set foot on northern soil,” through 
bringing to light these contradictory laws.130 Not only did runaways create stress in this manner, 
but their activity provided fuel for abolitionists. Anti-slavery advocates were able to play off of 
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the issues that were brought into the spotlight by escaped slaves and the accounts given in 
fugitive slave narratives were effective as well.131   
 These efforts by the slaves to create change rather than sit and wait for it to happen 
reveals an underestimate by the founding fathers as to the abilities of these individuals. At the 
Constitutional Convention there were delegates who clearly considered slaves to be people. 
Evidence for this is found in the arguments previously presented involving the inhumanity of the 
slave trade and contradiction of the ideals of the American Revolution and the peculiar 
institution. Yet the compromise that was eventually achieved in creating the three-fifths clause 
ultimately stated that slaves were not considered as a whole person. Along these same lines, the 
agreement to permit the human traffic of the slave trade for a minimum of twenty years further 
exhibits the notion that these individuals were regarded as inferior. It follows that the lack of 
attention given to the issue of fugitive slaves in 1787 likely had to do with this overall trend in 
belief that slaves were not capable of being a major threat in terms of taking part in a widespread 
movement to run away. Had the founders recognized this ability they would have been forced to 
spend more time trying to come up with the best way to handle the issue of fugitive slaves, yet 
their lack of attention and discussion points to the rationale that blacks were inferior. 
 There are a number of reasons why the fugitive slave issue became such a problem in the 
years following the Constitutional Convention. First, it simply had to do with numbers. As the 
slave population in the southern states continued to increase, it was inevitable that the number of 
runaways would escalate in direct correlation. Another explanation is that the non-slaveholding 
states were reluctant, and even refused, to take part in assisting with the capture and return of the 
accused. As anti-slavery sentiment was growing in the northern regions of the nation the chances 
of a runaway being able to elude capture increased. The Underground Railroad played a key role 
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in this process, and over time it developed into a complex and highly successful system. Prior to 
slavery being outlawed in all of the northern states there was no true assurance that a fugitive 
slave might obtain freedom upon reaching these regions. Yet as Pennsylvania, New York, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Connecticut had all installed at 
least an act for gradual emancipation by 1805 the likelihood of remaining free from bondage 
after running away began to increase. Still another factor that played a role is that as slaves began 
to be second and third generation Americans they became more knowledgeable of the landscape, 
language, and opportunities to receive help on their journey. This undoubtedly encouraged and 
motivated slaves to take the risk at obtaining freedom.  
 The fugitive slave clause was unanimously agreed upon on August 29, 1787. This came 
after the idea had only been mentioned once previously, one day earlier, in a discussion that 
lasted for only a few moments. A desire to refrain from further long-winded debate on a new 
issue, lack of importance in the eyes of the delegates, and an underestimation of the capabilities 
of the slaves are all potential reasons as to the minimal attention paid to the topic. The most 
likely explanation comes from the fact that the Northwest Ordinance had been passed while the 
Convention was in session. It contained a fugitive slave provision of its own, making a strong 
case for such a clause to appear in the Constitution as well. The seemingly insignificant matter 
proved to have dramatic effects on the nation in the following years as demonstrated by the 
Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 and 1850, and the U.S. Supreme Court case Prigg v. Pennsylvania 
(1842). The issues surrounding these events did much in the way of exposing the increasing 
sectional tension between the North and South, which played a significant role in leading to the 
American Civil War. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 As scholarship has attempted to demonstrate in recent times, early United States history 
has unfortunately been stained with slavery. The founding document of the nation, the 
Constitution, is no exception. The three provisions which affected the institution most directly 
are the three-fifths, slave trade, and fugitive slave clauses. Of these sections, the latter proved to 
be by far the most controversial in the long-run. Although the other two received lengthy debates 
and caused great concern in 1787 during the General Convention and over the next few years as 
the states discussed ratification, they caused limited levels of strain on the nation throughout 
their duration. Yet had it not been for their inclusion in the founding document there more than 
likely would have been no union of the states as there came to be. Whether or not they would 
have been the only ones, it is certain that South Carolina and Georgia posed the greatest threat of 
refusing to ratify the Constitution. As for the fugitive slave clause, one can only speculate as to 
what would have happened had there been debate on the issue, but the bottom line is that there 
was no discussion on the topic. It was unanimously agreed upon after being brought up only 
twice. Perhaps the founders did not anticipate fugitive slaves to be numerous because they saw 
them as incapable of such a widespread effort, or it was assumed that the issue would take care 
of itself, but ultimately it was overlooked. In the roughly seventy years from the ratification of 
the Constitution until the outbreak of the American Civil War this clause blatantly revealed itself 
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to have the most dramatic effect on the United States in comparison with the other main slave-
related provisions.  
 It would have been tremendously impressive if any of the founders were able to foresee 
that the issue of fugitive slaves was going to escalate to grand proportions during the mid-
nineteenth century. In 1787 the sectional differences had not grown to the level they eventually 
reached in regards to the North being anti-slavery while the South increasingly utilized the 
peculiar institution. Slavery was yet to become widely implored as a means of running vast 
plantations for the cultivation of mass amounts of lucrative crops. The increasing number of 
slaves and the harsh conditions generated greater participation in the efforts of running away. For 
these reasons the men who shaped the United States cannot be blamed for having demonstrated 
oversight in regards to the turmoil this issue would create, yet failure to recognize slaves as 
capable of generating change through their own efforts can be attributed to the founders. 
Whether this notion is agreed upon or refuted, the irony of the changes in levels of significance 
of the matters addressed by the three most slave-related clauses of the Constitution is more 
difficult to deny. 
 The issue of determining whether or not to count slaves towards apportionment in the 
House of Representatives and for purposes of direct taxation was fueled by several categories of 
opinion in 1787. Basically, there were those who thought that slaves were undoubtedly 
considered property by their owners and it would be out of the question to count them as part of 
the population, others who believed slaves to be the equivalent of poor laborers of the North and 
as a result should be counted, and still those who held that this method would strictly benefit 
slaveholders while putting the rest of the nation at risk. However, following the compromise on 
the ratio of three-fifths, the matter faded out of the spotlight. The explosion in population 
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numbers in the northern states rendered the addition of southern House members futile because 
the population in those states grew at only about half the rate. Similarly, contention over the 
ability of Congress to control the slave trade was intense during the Constitutional Convention. 
Some delegates held that to explicitly put a restriction on Congress in regards to this topic was 
absurd. Another portion of the members were willing to put their individual preferences aside in 
order to ensure a Constitution that would be quickly and unanimously be ratified by the states. 
Finally, the men from South Carolina and Georgia insisted on the protection of the trade, as they 
relied upon it for their survival. Yet by 1808 these states had satisfied themselves in regards to 
the international importation of slaves, and following the outlawing of the process by Congress 
in that same year the domestic slave trade was beginning to rapidly expand, making any future 
needs easily fulfilled and eliminating controversy over re-opening the ports.  
 The controversy over the fugitive slave clause among the delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention can hardly be compared with the other two provisions because it was barely 
mentioned. Yet its influence on the nation as a whole over the subsequent seventy years far 
outweighed that of the issues of representation or the slave trade. The Fugitive Slave Act of 
1793, Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842), and the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 are the most profound 
ways by which this reality was exposed. Increasing numbers of slaves in the southern states, 
harsh conditions, and aid from abolitionists did much to instigate a vast amount of slaves to flee 
from bondage and journey to the North. As this continuously occurred the sectional differences 
between the two halves of the nation were highlighted and tensions increased. While it goes 
beyond the scope of this paper, the explosion of turmoil between the North and South in the 
American Civil War was certainly brought about to some extent through the controversies 
surrounding fugitive slaves. It is greatly ironic that of the blatantly slave-related clauses of the 
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Constitution of the United States, the one that received by far the least amount of attention at the 
General Convention in 1787 proved to have the most profound impact on the nation over the 
course of the years following its creation. 
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